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Artikeln utvecklar argumentet, att svensk politik om kulturell
mångfald och medborgarskap kan dra nytta av islamsk teori om
samhällskontrakt. Syftet är att belysa betydelsen av universalism
för mänskliga och medborgerliga rättigheter, och sambandet mel-
lan betoning av ’nationella värderingar’ och ojämlikhet mellan
majoritet och minoriteter. Tre typer av samband analyseras. Först,
sambandet mellan jämlikhet i ett mångkulturellt samhälle och
kulturella minoriteters möjlighet att generera kulturellt, socialt
och ekonomiskt ’kapital’, i Pierre Bourdieus bemärkelse. För det
andra, sambandet mellan jämlikhet i ett mångkulturellt samhälle
och ett universalistiskt samhällskontrakt. För det tredje, samban-
det mellan islamsk samhällskontraktsteori och europeiska mo-
derna samhällskontrakt, som kan förklaras av att europeiska
kontrakts- och toleransteoretiker, här John Locke, studerade ara-
biska och islam. Islamsk teori kan alltså ha bidragit till moderna
rättighets- och toleransbaserade samhällskontrakt. 
Nyckelord: Koranen, Ibn Ishaq, Tabari, Islam, samhällskontrakt,
mänskliga rättigheter, multikulturalism, universalism, ahl al-kitab 
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INTRODUCTION: ‘SECTARIANISING’ PEOPLES, ‘RELIGIOSIFYING’ CONFLICTS
I would like to contribute to the topic of the festschrift for Håkan Ry-
dving – Religion and Politics – with the otherworldly argument that
Swedish policy on cultural diversity and citizenship could beneﬁt from
Islamic social contract theory. The starting point was a seminar in May
2015 about ‘the philosophy of law and society’, arranged by Swedish
and Iraqi colleagues. My assigned topic was ‘multiculturalism and chal-
lenges to society’, which I approached through an argument involving
three analytical relationships. Firstly, between equal opportunities and
outcomes in a multicultural society, and the ability of individuals and
groups to generate cultural, social and economic ‘capital’, in Pierre
Bourdieu’s sense of the term. Secondly, between equal opportunities
and outcomes in a multicultural society, and a universalistic social con-
tract. Thirdly, between Islamic social contract theory, and modern
rights- and tolerance-based social contracts. As we shall see, early mod-
ern European political thinkers, including John Locke, studied Arabic
and Islam, and Islamic theory may have contributed towards European
political theory. Here I will highlight the signiﬁcance of universalism
for recognition of human and civil rights, and argue that the ascendance
of ‘national values’ over ‘universal rights’ increases inequality. I draw
inspiration from Roxanne Euben’s approach in Enemy in the Mirror
(1999), but where she explores ‘foundationalism’ in modern western
and Islamic political theory, I focus on universalism and social contract.
I set out by addressing the multipronged question posed to me in the
seminar in 2015: should not ‘the majority’ determine what constitutes
‘Islamic cultural capital’, in terms of what interpretations of the Qur’an
beneﬁt co-existence in a multicultural society? And should we not agree
that exclusive and intolerant interpretations are less valuable than in-
clusive and tolerant ones? Following E.D. Hirsch, Jr (1967), there are
two ways to interpret a text: to deﬁne its meaning, or its current signiﬁ-
cance. Applied to the Qur’an: its meaning is deﬁned by its historical
and linguistic context of origins, while its signiﬁcance is deﬁned by its
interpreters’ socio-political, ethical and doctrinal considerations. In both
cases, human, civil and academic rights to freedom of religion, con-
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science, expression, and research, commit us to free enquiry into the
Qur’an’s meaning and signiﬁcance. I therefore ask: given that tolerance
implies allowing intolerant interpretations, how can society beneﬁt from
interpretations deemed intolerant?
A pertinent Islamic case is takﬁr, ‘to declare someone apostate’, i.e.
excommunicate someone from the faith. Excommunication can be
purely doctrinal. However, it can also be a legal matter. Since the faith
constitutes the bond between the law and the person as bearer of legal
rights, including the right to protection of life, declaring a Muslim to
have left the faith means, according to most pre-modern legal rulings,
withdrawing the person’s right to protection by the law. Takﬁr in this
legal sense is used both by states and against states (Griffel 2007). In
the conﬂicts in Iraq and Syria, ISIS referred to takﬁr to justify war
against, among others, Shiite Muslims. According to the Saudi Arabian
writer Al-Ibrahim (2015), without being a product of the Hanbali school
of law, ISIS nevertheless echoes legacies associated with the Hanbali
scholar and preacher Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1206/1792).
Together with the amir of the Al Sa‘ud tribe, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab es-
tablished the emirate of Dir‘iyya in the Najd, from which they chal-
lenged and temporarily ended Ottoman rule over the Hijaz, taking
control over the Prophet’s cities Mecca and Medina. Indeed, the Wah-
habi movement even claimed legitimacy by identifying with the
Prophet’s own mission. Thus, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s da‘wa was a call
for return to true tawhid, i.e. the creed of divine Oneness, and excom-
municating and ﬁghting those considered to have lapsed into idol wor-
ship. Tawhid here equalled loyalty with the Wahhabi da‘wa, i.e. ‘One
God’ signalling a quest for ‘one cause’, and the political aim to ﬁght an
‘external’ enemy – Ottoman authorities – actualising excommunication
(Al-Ibrahim 2015: 413; cf. Lapidus 1988: 673–674). Another example
from the period but in Moghul India is the tariqa muhammadiyya,
within the Indian branch of the Naqshbandiyya brotherhood. As a Suﬁ
method, tariqa muhammadiyya meant that the seeker should connect
with the Prophet through mystical union, in a new way that downplayed
the role of the Suﬁ shaykh as the path. Politically, tariqa muhammadiyya
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involved the vision of uniting Indian Muslims around the Prophet’s spir-
itual guidance, and rallying them around the Ottoman Caliphate in order
to withstand British encroachments upon the Mughal Empire (Schim-
mel 1985: 216–225; 1975: 227, 373–383). Hence, even though the Ot-
toman Caliphate played different roles in the Wahhabi movement and
tariqa muhammadiyya – foe or friend – both used visions of the Prophet
as symbols of unity based on ‘the true creed’, to ﬁght off an external
enemy. 
In our time, according to Al-Ibrahim, ISIS conformed to a Wahhabi-
like pattern of da‘wa for ‘political tawhid’ under its self-declared
Caliphate, but in opposition to contemporary Saudi Wahhabism, which
legitimises the monarchy and has no territorial claims beyond Saudi
borders (Al-Ibrahim 2015: 411–12). It appears that doctrinal purity was
not the driving force behind the call for unity. In Iraq in 2014-2017,
ISIS rallied both local forces and international brigades of ﬁghters, in-
cluding from Scandinavia. Among the local forces were those who, con-
sistently with international law, refused to accept the US-led invasion
of Iraq in 2003, or, more problematically, the ensuing Iraqi constitution
(2005) and internationally recognised government (2006). Some leading
commanders of ISIS were ofﬁcers and high-ranking members of the
Baath party that ruled before 2003, and some of them formed a military
command network through the Iraqi branch of the Suﬁ Naqshbandiyya
brotherhood. Thus, it was ‘foreign enemies and their local allies’ who
provided the target for ISIS’ takﬁr, including the old enemy Iran of the
Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988 which after 2003 became a powerbroker on
Iraqi territory, supporting a Shi‘ite party and militias (Natali 2015;
MERIP 2015; Rohde 2010). Some analysts therefore conclude that ISIS
would not have emerged without the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (MERIP
2015).1 Its takﬁr should make us reﬂect on why international law is
founded on territorial sovereignty.
1 ISIS is comparable with the rise of the Taliban after decades of invasions and civil war
in Afghanistan, and the Islamic Courts and al-Shabaab in Somalia in similar circum-
stances; see Hansen (2013) on al-Shabaab, its connection with Afghan veterans from
the ‘defensive jihad’, and its strategy to unify tribes and fight off ‘foreign intrusions’
from Ethiopia and Kenya. 
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Through the international jihad brigades, and Swedish and Norwe-
gian support of Iraq’s government and national reconstruction, the fates
of Iraq and Scandinavia intersect. Due to global migration, Scandina-
vian countries have a greater diversity of Islamic schools, brotherhoods,
and movements than Iraq, representing over thirty different national
backgrounds. The fact that the warring Iraqi parties are religiously and
ethnically identiﬁed, as Sunni, Shia, Arab and Kurd, and are Scandina-
vian citizens at the same time as Scandinavian countries engage in the
conﬂicts in Iraq and Syria, constitutes a challenge for the human and
civil rights upon which multiculturalism depends.
Following the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR, 1966/1976), which is an adaptation of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights (1948), paragraphs 18 and 19 – freedom of reli-
gion, conscience, opinion and expression – are both individual and
collective rights. One has the individual and collective right to publicly
practice and teach one’s religion, and parents have the right to educate
their children in accordance with their religious and moral convictions.
Restrictions concern others’ rights, e.g. parents’ rights must not violate
the rights of the child, according to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC, 1989/1990. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs 
may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are
necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the funda-
mental rights and freedoms of others. (ICCPR, 18:3) 
Freedom of expression is, in its turn,
subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided
by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of oth-
ers; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre pub-
lic), or of public health or morals. (ICCPR, 19:3) 
Freedom of religion and expression thus allows public teaching and ex-
pression of interpretations that do not threaten national security, public
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order, health and morals, or the rights of others. Doctrinal excommuni-
cation, i.e. to posit a boundary of the faith and deﬁne who falls outside
of it, does not in itself infringe the law and public order; it depends on
the circumstances. Doctrinal excommunication is part of Christianity;
e.g. the Catholic Church still excommunicates on grounds of divorce
and abortion (Wilde 2001). 
Legal excommunication, however, is problematic. Moreover, it is
not limited to religion. European governments have started revoking
citizenship from citizens of ‘foreign’ origins, in violation of human
rights and putting individuals’ lives at risk (Lenard 2018). Scandinavian
governments are part of this development. Their support of the Iraqi
government has come with a public discourse that ‘religiosiﬁes’ the po-
litical conﬂict, i.e. it explains ISIS primarily in terms of Sunni Islamic
extremism, not the 2003 illegal invasion and ensuing national and re-
gional meltdown. In 2014 the Norwegian government launched a new
national plan to combat radicalisation and extremism, in response to
ISIS and general ‘jihad-support’, requiring public servants and citizens
to report suspect views, including in schools (Handlingsplan 2014:27–
30). Sweden adopted a similar strategy in 2016. A study comparing the
Nordic anti-radicalisation strategies concludes that they have serious
negative implications for democracy and social trust, by transferring
intelligence service responsibilities to the public, and giving ‘Islamists’
and Muslim immigrants disproportionate and stigmatizing attention
(Sivenbring 2016). In Norway, Sunni communities who were not sup-
portive of ISIS have been singled out in the media as prone to ‘radical-
isation’, and confronted with demands to denounce ISIS (Aftenposten
2014; Rabås 2014). At the same time, Norwegians with Kurdish back-
ground travel to Iraq and Syria to ﬁght, but that is unproblematic since
they ﬁght on the same side as the Norwegian government (Rabås
2014b). Nor is much political concern devoted to Iran’s mobilisation of
Shiite ‘foreign ﬁghters’ from Afghanistan for the wars in Syria and Iraq
(Saﬁ 2016; The Economist 2016). Simultaneously, in autumn 2014
western bombings of Iraq and Syria resumed on a massive scale in the
campaign against ISIS. By summer 2017, Amnesty International con-
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cluded that both ISIS and the internationally backed Iraqi government
forces have committed war crimes and deliberately targeted citizens.2
Swedish politicians’ consent to destroying ISIS at any cost is legitimised
by language that de-humanises these people; e.g., Swedish foreign min-
ister Margot Wallström in a speech intended for the Arab League in
March 2015 referred to ISIS as a ‘scourge’: 
Together we face growing extremism and radicalisation. ISIL or Da’esh is
an example in the extreme. We need to work together to ﬁght this scourge,
to identify and deal with its root causes and to do this while paying full re-
spect to human rights and international law (Wallström 2015).
A ‘scourge’ is a torture instrument, or an animal infestation. Although
most people agree that ISIS deserves such labels (or worse), politicians
pledging allegiance to human rights and international law cannot refer
to anyone as an animal infestation. The premise of the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights is that each human being has inherent dignity
and freedom, including war criminals and mass-murderers. ‘Dealing
with root causes’ in a human rights-based way requires respecting all
warring parties as digniﬁed human beings with equal rights. Wallström’s
choice of words gives a lie to this, including her framing of the issue as
2 The Norwegian news agency NTB reported that around 9000-11000 civilians died in
the liberation of Mosul between October 2016 and July 2017 (Klassekampen, 21
December 2017, p. 16). Kurdish reports to the Independent journalist Patrick Cockburn
estimate around 40.000 civilians dead in Mosul, and around 90% of the ancient city’s
infrastructure and buildings destroyed (Independent, 19 July 2017,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/mosul-massacre-battle-isis-
iraq-city-civilian-casualties-killed-deaths-fighting-forces-islamic-state-a7848781.html).
The deaths were due to ISIS killing civilians fleeing the city and holding civilians hos-
tage, and the western US-led and Iraqi government coalition aerial and ground
bombardment. According to Amnesty International “a pattern of attacks in which US-
led coalition and Iraqi forces appear not to have struck their intended military targets,
instead killing and injuring civilians and destroying or damaging civilian objects. In
some cases, civilian deaths and injuries appear to have resulted from a choice of
weapons that was inappropriate for the circumstances or failure to take necessary





one of ‘growing extremism and radicalisation’, which echoes the na-
tional security plans but glosses over the political issues. 
The importance of policy is highlighted in the volume Religion and
Nationalism in Iraq: A Comparative Perspective (Little and Swearer
2007). Case studies of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious countries
Iraq, Bosnia, Sudan and Sri Lanka show that equal opportunities and
the inclusion of all groups into public institutions is essential for social
cohesion, and that success or failure depend on political management.
Iraq’s 2005 constitution, crafted under US tutelage, is matched by a
sect- and ethnicity-based coalition government, similar to Lebanon’s
French-backed constitution and sect-based government. Ironically,
while both the Lebanese and the Iraqi constitutions may appear ‘au-
thentically Middle Eastern’ because of their sect-ethnicity-based struc-
ture for power sharing, they are products of French and US domination.3
In the post-2003 Iraqi political order, the Kurds and the Shiite Arabs
hold the most powerful positions of presidency and premiership. The
order may appear reasonable, given the numerical proportions of
‘Kurds’, ‘Arab Shiites’ and ‘Arab Sunnis’. However, it reﬂects problems
with power sharing. Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki (2006–
2014) routinely dismissed as Sunni extremist and sectarian hostility po-
litical protests from citizens in the Sunni-dominated Anbar province
against his redistributive policies, and against his detention orders and
death sentences against Sunni government ministers on charges of ter-
rorism (BBC 2012; Wicken 2012). The Anbar province suffers from se-
vere draught and weapons-caused pollution of its dwindling water
reserves, which has made life increasingly difﬁcult for its inhabitants
over many years (Chaudhry 2010). The water crises is caused by
decades of war and infrastructural decline (Rohde 2010), but is also
used as a war tool. When ISIS took control of the Anbar province in
June 2015, in revenge it cut off water supplies for areas under the Bagh-
dad government’s control, drying out the southern Iraqi marshlands
(Paraszczuk 2015; Yacoub 2015). 
3 On the role of modern Ottoman and European colonial politics in shaping the Lebanese
‘sectarian system’, see Makdisi (2000).
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Part of the explanation for ISIS cruelty and vengefulness might be
the policy adopted upon the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The conquering
US force dispersed the Iraqi army and ruling Baath party, hunting down
leading Baath ofﬁcials through the notorious Deck of Cards. Capture
meant execution (BBC 2010; Sissons and Al-Saeidi 2013). This left a
large part of the Iraqi establishment with no choice but to ﬁght. Still, it
is predictable that the USA would disregard human rights. Executions
within a culture of discrimination is part of the American legal system:
the USA executes disproportionately many of its black citizens, and
sometimes on false charges (Pefﬂey and Hurwitz 2007). One can com-
pare with US interventions in former Yugoslavia. The Serb leaders and
other war criminals were brought to justice in the Hague Tribunal, and
were never threatened with execution. Concerning Middle Eastern peo-
ple, the USA have no qualms over facilitating executions. Neither do
Swedish politicians, apparently. In April 2017, the then Minister of In-
terior Anders Ygeman (Labour) announced that Swedish citizens ﬁght-
ing for ISIS would be tried in Iraq, to stop them returning to Sweden.
They would be executed.4 Since the re-conquest of Mosul from ISIS
began in autumn 2016, the Iraqi government has been mass-executing
ISIS captives, partly to silence popular demands for political reforms,
while European governments deliberate what to do with their citizens
captured in Iraq.5 Swedish politicians apparently agree to Swedish cit-
izens being executed in Iraq, even though Sweden does not have capital
punishment.6 Consequently, Swedish citizens associated with the group
that the Foreign Minister Wallström called ‘scourges’, i.e. animals, may
lose their right to protection by their own government, which all but ig-
4 Per Kudo, Sveriges Radio, 6 April 2017 (http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?pro-
gramid=83&artikel=6664511); ’Kritik mot Ygemans uttalande att svenska IS-krigare
ska dömas i Irak’, Aftonbladet 15 June 2017. (https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/
aVP4A/kritik-mot-ygemans-uttalande-att-svenska-is-krigare-ska-domas-i-irak). 
5 Josie Ensor, The Telegraph, 13 September 2017 (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
2017/09/13/iraq-sentences-russian-isil-fighter-death-hanging-first-ruling/).
6 De-humanising language signals extraordinary treatment; Gardell (2008) warned of
how the US administration after 9/11 justified torture, by framing ‘The Jihadist’ as a
representation of non-human Evil.
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nores war crimes the US-led coalition against ISIS have committed (see
note 2, above). Mirroring ISIS’ takﬁr of Muslims ﬁghting on the ‘wrong
side’, the Swedish government denies legal protection of those citizens
ﬁghting on the wrong side. It is a ‘sectarianising’ strategy, since the gov-
ernment deﬁnes the warring parties and security risks in religious terms.
CONCEPTS
After this long introduction, I will develop my argument that Islamic
theory can serve as source of inspiration in developing a new Swedish
social contract, through the concepts multiculturalism, equal opportu-
nities, universalism, social contract, and capital. 
Multiculturalism refers to ‘a distinctive model for the management
of cultural diversity’, involving a political demand for recognition and
equality for cultural groups. As a policy, multiculturalism thus recog-
nises that the people consist of several ethnic and cultural groups,
wherefore conformity to a ‘majority culture’ is not a requirement for
equal opportunities (Bousetta and Jacobs 2006: 26 passim). Susan
Moller Okin’s essay ‘Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?’ (1999) is
the reference for the critique, that supporters of multiculturalism accept
that some cultures limit especially women’s rights. Consequently, mul-
ticulturalism furthers inequalities, both within communities and be-
tween ‘liberal majorities’ and minorities, since restricting women’s life
choices reduces a group’s competitiveness. Referring to Canadian and
American contexts, Okin argues that since all cultural minorities dis-
criminate more against women than the ‘liberal majority’, no one who
supports gender equality and the liberal principle of individual rights
should grant minority groups the right to resources for preserving their
religion and other cultural practices. Okin’s main interlocutor is Will
Kymlicka, liberal Canadian defender of multiculturalism. In a response
to Okin (Kymlicka 1999), he argues that minorities do not have the col-
lective right to break a non-discriminatory law, e.g. deny women their
rights. However, minority cultures should receive public support be-
cause group cultures provide identity and the capacity to live a life of
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one’s choice, and deliberations about women’s rights are carried out
within groups, with reference to their own norms and terms. Hence,
Kymlicka argues, culture provides freedoms and beneﬁts that outweigh
the downsides, for both individuals and groups.
Consequently, multiculturalism has implications for equality of op-
portunity and outcome. Equality of opportunity means ‘the assignment
of individuals to places in the social hierarchy (…) by some form of
competitive process, and [the eligibility of] all members of society (…
) to compete on equal terms’ (Arneson 2015); and equality of outcome
refers to individuals’ actual achievements in education, labour market,
politics, living standards, wages, health, etc. (Phillips 2004). Belonging
to a minority culture may limit equality of opportunity and outcome,
due to both internal norms and ‘external’ discrimination. Nevertheless,
I follow Kymlicka. I deﬁne equality of opportunity and outcome for all
members of society as the objective, but with support for cultural mi-
norities to preserve their cultures and religions. The human right to free-
dom of conscience and religion, and parents’ right to raise their children
according to their religion and culture, makes such public support an
obligation. 
The third concept, universalism, refers to things that apply univer-
sally. There is tension between universalism and multiculturalism as
recognition of cultural difference. France constitutes an interesting case.
Generally, French left wing republicans deﬁne the French social con-
tract as founded upon the universal values of the Enlightenment, which
any citizen, regardless of cultural background, is expected to share.
However, these universal values are granted only one public cultural
expression, namely the majority’s public culture, which is ‘secular’ in
a way that excludes religious symbols that are not mainstream Catholic.
The logic of this social contract and public culture is that “[t]he bond
of citizenship would be eroded if society were fragmented into a col-
lection of identity groups seeking recognition of their difference instead
of working toward the public interest” (Laborde 2001:720). Conse-
quently, France legislated in 2004 to ban the wearing of hijab and other
‘ostensible’ religious symbols, like the Jewish yarmulke, in public
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schools (Benhabib 2010). In response to cases complaining this law,
the European Court of Human Rights has ruled in favour of the law, re-
ferring to the ICCPR and the European Convention on Human Rights,
which allows the French legislature to decide what public manifesta-
tions of religion challenge ‘public order, health or morals’. 
The example brings out the tension between the universal rights that
underpin human rights in the UDHR charter, and the identiﬁcation of a
speciﬁc national public culture as the authority that deﬁnes what those
universal rights mean in practice, as in the international conventions
(cf. Benhabib 2010; 2006). In the French case, minority cultures are not
considered representative of the public, even though they may have
deep historical roots in France. For Seyla Benhabib (2006), the univer-
sality of human rights, applied in a society with several cultural and re-
ligious groups, means that minorities have the civil right to
democratically restate or ‘iterate’ deﬁnitions of national public culture.
If citizens whose religion and conscience commits them to wearing
hijab or yarmulke cannot engage in public politics due to the majority’s
view that their religious practices threaten public order, their civil rights
are limited. Consequently, the right to equal political opportunities for
cultural minorities requires more universalistic universalism than one
that limits public culture to majoritarian deﬁnitions. 
Social contract refers to political theories that show ‘why and under
what conditions government is useful and ought therefore to be accepted
by all reasonable people as a voluntary obligation. These conclusions
were then reduced to the form of a social contract, from which it was
supposed that all the essential rights and duties of citizens could be log-
ically deduced’ (EB 2015). The European social contract theories date
to the early modern period and the Enlightenment, e.g. Thomas Hobbes
(d. 1679), John Locke (d. 1704), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (d. 1778).
They share the premise of a ‘state of nature’, characterised by absence
of a civil society, but which can be transcended through the agreement
to convene around a social contract which curbs everyone’s freedoms
enough to enable society, and from which the rights and obligations of
citizens is deduced (EB 2015). 
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In the present, the European Union, of which Sweden is a member,
represents a liberal democratic social contract, grounded in the Euro-
pean Convention of Human Rights and the international human rights
conventions. In the 1990s the European Commission became concerned
that minorities’, especially Muslims’, religious and cultural rights were
not recognised, which threatens social cohesion (Silvestri 2009). A new
policy recommendation of ‘civic integration’ was formulated and ex-
pressed in The Declaration on Intercultural Dialogue and Conﬂict Pre-
vention (DIDCP), adopted in 2003 by the European Ministers of
Cultural Affairs. Europe should aim at 
the principle of equality between cultures, the value of cultural heterogene-
ity and the constructive dimension of dialogue and of peace. Differences
and divisions must not therefore be viewed as harmful and obstructive to
the devising of a collective project which requires differences to be taken
into account and otherness to be respected (DIDCP 2004:10).
Thus, at EU-level, civic integration means mutual accommodation be-
tween the member countries and their national cultures, and between
majorities and minorities within the countries. At the national levels,
however, countries that had previously had multicultural policies, like
the Netherlands and Sweden, from the late 1990s started deﬁning ‘na-
tional culture’ in the terms of the ethnic majority, much like French as-
similation. The civic values of liberal democracy and human rights were
now deﬁned as e.g. ‘Dutch’, but not ‘Moroccan’, implying that a Dutch
citizen of Moroccan background can identify with democratic values
only by assimilating into ‘Dutch culture’ (Stolcke 1995; Entzinger 2006;
Verkaaik 2010; cf. Sivenbring 2016). While the EU-level represents a
social contract that is universal enough to recognize cultural difference
as positive assets, individual countries tend to construct ‘national values’
in intolerant terms that exclude minority cultures, in line with Okin’s
policy recommendation (1999). 
The ﬁnal concept is capital. The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu
(1986) deﬁned ‘capital’ as three kinds of assets that individuals and
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groups can generate in society. Cultural capital consists in education
and family background. It is embodied as individuals’ comportment,
and transmitted through education, art, entertainment, religion, politics,
law, etc. Economic capital is property and other ﬁnancial assets. Social
capital is networks, contacts, and class. The forms of capital are con-
vertible. Cultural capital is both the precondition for and outcome of
social and economic capital; and vice-versa. Especially relevant here is
Bourdieu’s analysis of how dominant classes protect their economic
and social capital by enhancing the importance of culture:
Because the question of the arbitrariness of appropriation arises most
sharply in the process of transmission – particularly at the time of succes-
sion, a critical moment for all power – every reproduction strategy is at the
same time a legitimation strategy aimed at consecrating both an exclusive
appropriation and its reproduction. When the subversive critique which
aims to weaken the dominant class through the principle of its perpetuation
by bringing to light the arbitrariness of the entitlements transmitted and of
their transmission (such as the critique which the Enlightenment
philosophes directed, in the name of nature, against the arbitrariness of
birth) is incorporated in institutionalized mechanisms (for example, laws
of inheritance) aimed at controlling the ofﬁcial, direct transmission of
power and privileges, the holders of capital have an ever greater interest in
resorting to reproduction strategies capable of ensuring better-disguised
transmission, but at the cost of greater loss of capital, by exploiting the
convertibility of the types of capital. Thus the more the ofﬁcial transmission
of capital is prevented or hindered, the more the effects of the clandestine
circulation of capital in the form of cultural capital become determinant
in the reproduction of the social structure. As an instrument of reproduction
capable of disguising its own function, the scope of the educational system
tends to increase, and together with this increase is the uniﬁcation of the
market in social qualiﬁcations which gives rights to occupy rare positions.
(Bourdieu 1986: 92–93; italics added)
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Bourdieu’s analysis might explain why EU member states enhance the
majority culture as the national culture and norms that minorities must
adopt: it is the majority’s way of protecting and reproducing their cap-
ital, when faced with competition from new, culturally deﬁned minority
groups. One can thus view the assimilation-to-national-values-policy
as a protectionist strategy stacked against equal opportunities and out-
comes for cultural minorities. 
Given the convertibility of capital, public recognition of minority
groups’ culture as ‘valuable capital’ is necessary for equal opportunities
and outcomes. Since education is the main conduit for cultural capital,
it follows that minority cultures can only become publicly perceived as
valuable cultural capital if the national education system teaches reli-
gions and cultures as beneﬁts to national culture. For example, Islam is
both a religion and a civilisation with a history of ideas and a wide range
of scholarly disciplines and schools. To appreciate this fact, beyond the
study of Islam within Religious studies curricula, Islamic theology
should be integrated into Theology departments; Islamic law into Fac-
ulties of Law; Islamic history and historiography into History depart-
ments; Islamic philosophy into Philosophy departments; Islamic
banking and ﬁnance into Economy and Business studies; and so on.
Such processes are underway, with the introduction of a chair of Islamic
theology at Uppsala University’s Faculty of Theology, and a lectureship
in Islamic law at Uppsala’s Faculty of Law. Their continuous develop-
ment is potentially important part of enhancing the public value of Islam
as cultural capital.7
I will now refer these concepts to studies from Europe, Sweden, and
Iraq, and ﬁnally to Islamic social contract theory.
7 On the importance for multicultural recognition, academic advancement, and
democratic citizenship, of including non-western philosophies in western Philosophy
curricula, see van Norden (2017). 
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NATIONAL VALUES OR EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES
Assessing the claim behind the new European national discourses about
national values and their difference from especially Muslims’ values,
the American social scientists Pamela Irving Jackson and Peter Doer-
schler (2012) decided to study Muslims’ values in the UK, the Nether-
lands, France and Germany, using data from national surveys. Their
ﬁndings show that the political discourse, that Muslims do not share the
European values of liberal democracy and human rights, do not corre-
spond with Muslims’ actual values. Muslims report higher degrees of
discrimination than the population averages, particularly regarding their
religion and cultures, and they score below average on participation
and leadership in party politics. Yet these experiences are not reﬂected
in their political values and engagement in political affairs at national
and international levels. In fact, Muslims report slightly stronger than
average support for the democratic state and its authorities, for demo-
cratic values, for human rights, and engagement in national and inter-
national politics, combined with stronger than average signiﬁcance
attributed to religion (Islam).8 They are also slightly more optimistic
about their countries’ futures than the average. The only group that
stands out as distrustful of national authorities are young French Muslim
men; Jackson and Doerschler (2012) attribute this to French policy of
police raids and stop-search policy, targeting young men of North
African and Middle Eastern backgrounds. 
The discrepancy between stronger than average political engage-
ment, democratic values, and signiﬁcance attributed to religion, and
lower participation and leadership in party politics, indicates that ob-
stacles to participation are unrelated to Muslims’ values and religion.
Jackson and Doerschler (2012) therefore recommend that politicians
abandon new citizenship regimes and discourses about Muslims’ lack
of civic values, and instead implement equal opportunities and out-
8 Cf. Ishaq (2017: 224–234), the first statistically valid study of Norwegian Muslims’
political values, though not normalised against the population average: findings show
strong support for democracy and human rights, combined with strong significance
attributed to Islam for identity and daily life.
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comes. Swedish studies support the recommendation. Strömblad and
Myrberg (2013) show that political parties recruit signiﬁcantly lower
numbers of members from poor urban areas with high per cent residents
of immigrant background, than from wealthy areas with majority ‘eth-
nic’ Swedes. The authors hypothesise that campaigners from the polit-
ical parties anticipate low levels of political interest in
immigrant-dominated neighbourhoods and therefore avoid them.
Odmalm and Lee show that minority groups ﬁnd the established
Swedish political parties do not, and will not, engage in minority-related
issues such as cultural rights (Odmalm and Lee 2006:8–14). Neither
study explains lower participation and leadership rates. However, the
political parties’ refusal to make minority cultures a legitimate issue re-
ﬂects the generally ‘low capital’ attributed to minority cultures, which
may discourage individuals of minority backgrounds. 
Regarding social contract, Swedish policy mirrors developments
within the EU. According to Schierup and Ålund (2011), the welfare
state after 1945 was founded on a social contract where the state was
obliged to provide each citizen with the means for education, profes-
sional development, political participation, childcare, and health (cf.
Trägårdh 2010). In the 1970s, when growing numbers of migrants from
Africa and the Middle East arrived, Sweden adopted a policy of multi-
culturalism with a citizenship contract founded on years of residence
and equal political, social and economic rights for all. During the 1990s,
however, a new citizenship contract emerged, aimed at ‘integration’ on
the basis of ‘Swedish values’, identiﬁed politically as liberal democracy
and human rights, and religious-culturally as ‘(Judeo-) Christian-Hu-
manistic’ – but never ‘Muslim’ (cf. Mårtensson 2010). According to
Schierup and Ålund (2011), the premise of the new integration policy
is that immigrants are not well integrated, because their cultures conﬂict
with ‘Swedish’ values. By focusing on culture and values, the discourse
obscures the realities of the post-1980s neo-liberal economy, with in-
creasing segregation along economic and cultural lines in the labour
market and in living areas. Thus, Schierup and Ålund (2011) explain
recurrent violent riots in suburbs among youth of immigrant back-
95
1/2018
grounds as justiﬁed frustration and demands for economic solidarity, a
value typically associated with traditional Swedish social democracy. 
In fact, Sweden is experiencing faster rise in social inequality than
other OECD countries. According to Fredlund-Blomst (2014), the rea-
son is the combined effects of the 1990s economic downturn, and higher
numbers of refugees without formal education than in other western
countries. Viewed from this perspective, the new integration policy aims
at facilitating employment, assuming that immigrants’ assimilation into
‘Swedish values’ will help them acquire cultural capital and thereby ac-
cess to employment or economic capital. However, as already le Grand
and Szulkin (2002) show, even immigrants of African, Asian and Latin
American backgrounds who do have adequate ‘human capital’ still suf-
fer signiﬁcant economic disadvantages compared with ‘ethnic’ Swedes,
suggesting that rise in social inequalities is also related to systemic dis-
crimination. Focusing integration policy on ‘Swedish values’ thus shifts
responsibility from policy to ‘culture’. 
Yet, the ‘knowledge economy’ and increasingly automated industrial
production is making education more important and reducing unquali-
ﬁed jobs. To counter unemployment, experiments with citizen wages
have been tried in the Netherlands and Finland. Every citizen gets a
baseline monthly wage from the state, with the possibility of increasing
one’s income through additional salaried work (Boffey 2015; Lillemets
et. al. 2015). There are numerous foreseeable negative outcomes of cit-
izen wage. It could entrench economic inequalities, if not everyone
could get an additional paid job. Yet citizen wage could liberate the un-
employed from humiliating beneﬁt regulations, and the public servants
from punishing the poor. It could also enable those who wish to develop
cultural and religious activities, including education in languages, lit-
eratures, arts, religions, and so on, to do so. Currently, such activities
either depend on state priorities and funding, or are limited to voluntary
activities. But if cultural educational programs were made available to
any interested member of the public, citizen wage could contribute to
turning minority cultures into ‘valuable capital’ in a multicultural soci-
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ety.9 Equal opportunities and outcomes monitoring would still be nec-
essary, to ensure equal treatment, and to improve policy.
ISLAMIC POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND LEGAL THEORY
Were one to develop a new multicultural social contract based on human
rights, Islamic social contract theory could provide inspiration. Histor-
ically, the Islamic social contract referred to a feudal and hierarchical
society, mostly with Sunni Muslim dynastic rulers. The law granted and
protected both individual and group rights, and the jurists as the law-
making institution guaranteed the legitimacy of the state as protector of
rights, and as just.10 The hierarchical and dynastic aspects of this social
contract are clearly irrelevant for a liberal multicultural society. What
is of interest here is its universalistic theory, which is more consistent
with the principle of ‘human rights’ than the frame of ‘national values’.
The key to its universalism is the Qur’anic concept of man as divine
Creation, as I will show through some historiographical and legal ex-
amples. 
The Arabic language is governed by polysemy, i.e. a word takes on
different aspects (wujuh, ‘faces’) of meaning in different contexts (Rip-
pin 1988). In the Prophet’s biography by Muhammad b. Ishaq (d.
150/767), edited by Muhammad b. Hisham (d. c. 213/828), the concept
kitab, which often means ‘book’, refers to the Prophet’s written contract
with the ‘faithful’, or more precisely ‘those who promote security’ (al-
9 See van Norden (2017), on difficulties in getting philosophies from Africa, China,
India, ’indigenous peoples’, even Islam and Judaism, included in university Philosophy
curricula: all resources are claimed for modern western European and North American
philosophy, deemed to be the real Philosophy. 
10 On rule of law and separation of powers in the early Islamic states, Feldman (2012)
argues that since the medieval states depended on tax revenue, and the jurists ensured
that the taxation was just, and had the social power to declare a caliph illegitimate, the
judiciary as legislative power was autonomous enough to subject the ruler to the law.
Feldman’s analysis follows e.g. Heck (2004); Lowry (2008). Zubaida (2003) and Vikør
(2005/2012), while not contradicting this picture, still rather perceive the jurists as sub-
ject to the state.
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mu’minuna),11 including the ‘migrants’ (muhajiruna) from Mecca and
the ‘helpers’ (al-ansar) from Medina, and the Jewish tribes of Medina.
The contracting parties have equal rights and obligations, including
freedom of religion, stipulated in the written document (Arjomand
2009). This contractual aspect of kitab is attested in the Qur’an, along-
side the other aspects ‘scripture’ and ‘people of scripture’ (ahl al-kitab).
Ahl al-kitab is a technical term for the Jews and the Christians, as re-
cipients of the same scripture that God sent down to the Prophet. How-
ever, when referred to the contractual aspect of kitab, ahl al-kitab takes
on the aspect ‘the parties to the written contract’ (Mårtensson 2008,
2011; Radscheit 1996). One example is from the Qur’an, sura 3, verses
64–68. Here, the Jews and the Christians are persuaded to enter a con-
tract of loyalty, on the grounds that they share Abraham with the speaker
of the Qur’an and thus already have knowledge about the contract:
(64) Say: “O Parties to the Written Contract/Adherents of the Scripture!
Arise and come to an equitable word between us and you: that we serve no
one but God, and do not make anything partner with Him (lā nushrika bihi
shayʾan), and do not take each other as lords instead of God!” Should they
turn away (tawallū), say: “Bear witness that we are promoters of peace
(muslimūna)!”
(65) O Parties to the Written Contract/Adherents of the Scripture! Why do
you argue about Abraham when the Torah and the Gospel were not sent
down until after him? Will you not be bound by reason (afalā taʿqilūna)?
(66) Here you are: you have argued concerning that about which you have
knowledge (ʿilm), so why do you argue concerning that about which you
have no knowledge? God knows and you do not know:
(67) Abraham was neither a Jew nor a Christian, but a ḥanīf and one who
promotes peace, since he was not among those who take other partners!
(68) Indeed, the people who are most loyal allies of Abraham (ʾawlā biʾI-
brāhīm) are those who followed him, and this Prophet and those who pro-
11 Mu’min means, literally, ‘one who promotes security, trust’ (’amn)’, in accordance with
the contractual frame; see the dictionary Lisan al-‘Arab, entry ’-m-n; also Mårtensson
(2008: 378–379, 397); Eggen (2011).
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mote security; and God is the Guardian (walī) of those who promote secu-
rity!  
Also from sura 3, verses 75–76 refer to ahl al-kitab in the context of
contract:
(75) Among the Parties to the Written Contract there are those who, if you
give them as security a heap of gold will return it to you, and there are
those who, if you entrust them with one dinar, will not return it to you un-
less you keep on demanding it. That is because the latter say: “We have no
obligations towards the ones devoid of writing!” knowingly uttering lies
on behalf of God. 
(76) Indeed, he who fulﬁls his contract meets his obligations: God truly
loves the ones who meet their obligations!
Further on in sura 3, verse 81 describes how God binds Himself by the
Covenant and contract that He enters with the prophets who preceded
the Prophet Muhammad: 
When God took the Firm Covenant (mithaq) from the prophets: “Now that
I have brought you a written contract and wisdom, and a messenger comes
to you conﬁrming what you have (received), you must have faith in him
and support him to victory! Do you afﬁrm this and take upon yourselves
my contract?” They said: “We afﬁrm it!” He said: “Bear witness, and I will
be a witness together with you!”
The paradigm for this Firm Covenant is sura 7, verse 172, where God
binds Himself to the Covenant with Adam, the ﬁrst human:
When God took from the backs of Adam’s sons their offspring and made
them testify for themselves: “Am I not your Lord?” They said: “Indeed,
we testify!” so that you will not say on the Day of Standing to trial: “But
we were unaware of this!”
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This verse grounds the principle of ‘contractual agreement’ in God’s
Creation of man, i.e. not only Muslims but all men. 
In al-Tabari’s (d. 310/923) History of the Messengers and the Kings
(Ta’rikh al-rusul wa’l-muluk), which chronicles pre-Islamic and Islamic
rulers and prophets from Creation to the year 915, kitab often appears
in conjunction with a social contract (mithaq and‘ahd), which subjects
the ruler to the law, and all individuals to the terms of the contracts they
have entered (Mårtensson 2009; 2011). Al-Tabari provides the social
contract with a universalistic frame, by describing how God established
the principle of writing (kitab) in Creation itself, since the ﬁrst thing He
created was the Pen, which wrote down the terms of each individual,
until Judgement Day. Then he described how God concluded mithaq,
i.e. the Firm Covenant, with Adam and all his offspring, as the Qur’anic
verse 7, 172 describes. On the basis of this contract theory, al-Tabari
proceeded to write history. ‘The state of nature’ here is rule of law,
through which God teaches man to promote peace. The antithesis is
‘Satanic temptation’, i.e. rejection of contract, with ensuing war and
suffering. Through concrete examples from royal history, al-Tabari
shows how mithaq and kitab was implemented as the contractual foun-
dation of statecraft and law, ﬁrst by the ancient Persian dynasties, then
by all subsequent peoples and rulers, and eventually the Arabs, the
Prophet, and the Caliphs. Any ruler, pre-Islamic or Muslim, as a creature
of God is equally capable to rule by law or fall for temptation. It should
be noted that ‘contract’ for al-Tabari is not enforced but a mutual agree-
ment, and its violation means infringing upon the rights of individuals
and groups, provoking rebellions that are justiﬁed in cause, if not effect
(Mårtensson 2009, 2011). 
Al-Tabari also wrote a Qur’an commentary (Jami‘ al-bayan ‘an
ta’wil ’ay al-Qur’an). Here, he locates the principle of rights in Cre-
ation, e.g. in his exegesis of sura 4, verse 1, where he establishes a con-
nection between the common origins and brotherhood of all humans
and the fact of ‘human rights’, and God’s imposition of the universal
obligation that the strong protect the rights of the weak:
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God means by His speech (O people, fulﬁl your obligations towards your
Lord Who created you by cleaving asunder one person; Q. 4:1): (…) He
described Himself as the One Who has created all the diverse beings from
one person to let His worshippers know how He issued forth (all) that from
one individual. Thus He informs them that since they are all offspring of
one man and one mother and are therefore all from one another, they are
obliged to uphold each others’ rights as brothers. (… They are obliged to)
act kindly, not oppressively, towards each other, so that the strong uphold
the rights of the weak, in accordance with what God has commanded them.
(…) 
The statement that ‘the strong uphold the rights of the weak’ reﬂects
the fact that society was hierarchical and included e.g. slaves. In spite
of hierarchy, however, all humans have rights. These universal rights
pertain to the social contract theory, designed to transcend the commu-
nity of Muslims because the contract included non-Muslims, as well. 
For this reason, the contract theory posited a universal framework
according to which all humans a priori possess the knowledge required
for the contract. This makes the Islamic social contract theoretically
similar to the universal human rights declaration, even though it is
framed with reference to divine Creation. Consequently, in the Qur’an,
the Prophet’s biography and al-Tabari’s history, kitab and ahl al-kitab
refer to a social contract theory. In the Islamic polities and law, ahl al-
kitab serves as a canonical theoretical concept, which legitimises the
institution ahl al-dhimma, ‘the people protected by the law’, i.e. those
non-Muslim religious communities, primarily Jews and Christians but
also others in other contexts, such as Hindus and Buddhists in the Indian
Sultanates, who enter into a contract with the Muslim rulers. Ahl al-
dhimma enjoyed protection by the Islamic law of life, religion, and
property, in exchange for tax and political loyalty. As concept, then, ahl
al-kitab signiﬁes not only that Jews and Christians possess ‘scripture’
as sacred canonical texts, but that they are contract parties with knowl-
edge about kitab as a legally binding agreement. Presumably, it is this
101
1/2018
contractual meaning-aspect of kitab that historically enabled its exten-
sion to other groups than Jews and Christians.  
Within legal theory, the period from ca. 700 CE onwards saw the
development of the theory that consideration of ‘public welfare’
(maslaha) should guide legislation and the ﬁnding of new laws through
interpretation of the Qur’an and sunna.12 By the 1100s, the Shaﬁ‘i jurist
al-Ghazzali (d. 505/1111) formalised a set of legal objectives (maqasid)
identiﬁed with ‘public welfare’, namely the individual’s right to life,
religion, intellect, property, and progeny. These rights extended also to
the ‘protected peoples’ (ahl al-dhimma) under Islamic law. The famous
Hanbali jurist, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), who used al-Tabari’s
Qur’an exegesis, developed a concept of Sharia as the divine guidance
that is identical with human ‘natural’ reason, law and morality (ﬁtra).
Ibn Taymiyya closely paralleled Mu‘tazilite rationalism, except that his
inductive method of deriving rulings from scripture differed from the
more deductive methods of the Mu‘tazila (Vasalou 2016). His corre-
sponding political theory was siyasa shar‘iyya, ‘politics according to
Sharia’. Ibn Taymiyya also developed maqasid from a ﬁxed list of ob-
jectives of legislation into an open-ended one, depending on the require-
ments of the context (Kamali 2008), although never in violation of
explicit scriptural rulings. Even in contemporary Europe, Islamic schol-
arly bodies deﬁne Sharia through a contractual loyalty with European
states and laws. The European Council of Fatwa and Research (ECFR)
is an example of an organisations using the maqasid and siyasa
shar‘iyya methodology. For example, ‘Abd al-Majid al-Najjar in the
essay Tajdid ﬁqh al-siyasa al-shar‘iyya, ‘Renewal of ﬁqh on politics
according to Sharia’, argues that active Muslim participation in Euro-
pean politics should involve actualising and renewing Islamic political
philosophy according to the European contexts, including human rights
(al-Najjar 2014:6). This is perfectly in line with Jackson and Doerschler
(2012) survey of European Muslims’ values (see above).
12 On maslaha and maqasid, see Abdelkader (2003); Opwis (2010); Bin Sattam (2015).
On rights and natural law theory, see Emon (2004-5; 2010).
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The connection that the medieval Muslim jurists established between
divine Creation and social contract resembles the signiﬁcance of Deism
for theories of ‘natural religion’ and ‘natural reason’, upon which Eu-
ropean theories of religious tolerance drew, and there may even be his-
torical connections. For example, John Locke (d. 1704) studied Arabic
at Oxford University. As Denise Spellberg shows, Locke developed his
ideas on religious tolerance by engaging with peers and colleagues, who
lauded Islamic principles. Locke’s teacher in Arabic, the Orientalist Ed-
ward Pococke and his son Edward Jr., who Locke tutored, translated
the Andalusian scholar Ibn Tufayl’s (d. 580/1185) ‘Enlightenment’ trea-
tise Hayy ibn Yaqzan, from Arabic to English. Locke also read the works
of his fellow student of Arabic, Henry Stubbe (d. 1676), who praised
Islam as a tolerant religion (Spellberg 2013:65–69).13 Even though there
is no evidence that Locke himself studied Islamic law, his social con-
tract theory contains a maqasid-like concept of legal objectives: 
The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every
one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but con-
sult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another
in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all the workman-
ship of one omnipotent, and inﬁnitely wise maker. (‘Second Treatise of
Government’, par. 6)
Here is a link between Islamic political and legal theory, and the En-
lightenment universalism and natural law theory, which also underpins
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. The UDHR dis-
tinguishes itself for its radical sanctiﬁcation of human life and dignity,
which takes protection of individual freedoms to a new level; yet the
universalistic theory of ‘human rights grounded in universal brother-
hood’ is the same. Islamic social contract theory thus reminds us that
universal rights require the a priori assumption that different culturally
and religiously deﬁned groups share political values. 




Multiculturalism offers equal opportunities and outcomes on the a pri-
ori assumption that cultural differences can coexist with cross-cultural
agreement about political values. This was exempliﬁed by Jackson and
Doerschler (2012) study of contemporary European Muslims’ values,
and my analysis of pre-modern Islamic social contract theory. More-
over, people must be free to democratically contest laws perceived as
discriminatory. ISIS and the Iraq war have made it clear that e.g. the
Swedish government operates with two categories of citizens: those
who can be executed by other states and stripped of their Swedish civil
rights, and those who cannot. These discriminatory practices reﬂect the
current integration policy’s premise, that the ‘national values’ are ‘eth-
nically Swedish’ and not a priori shared with minorities.
I have also argued that turning minorities’ knowledge into valuable
‘cultural capital’ is necessary because it converts into economic and so-
cial capital, enabling equal opportunities and outcomes for all cultural
groups. Moreover, it enables the a priori assumption of shared political
values, upon which multiculturalism depends. Currently in Sweden and
Norway, school and university education about Islam belongs to the
study of the world religions. Yet Islamic thought spans philosophy, the-
ology, history, law, political theory, economics, pedagogics, literature,
art, and religion, which requires integrating the academic study of Is-
lamic and other non-western religions and scholarly disciplines into uni-
versity curricula, beyond Religious studies. Once minorities’ cultures
become ‘valuable cultural capital’, it signiﬁes a resilient and human
rights-based liberal democracy. 
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With reference to Scandinavian and Islamic cases, the article explores
the signiﬁcance of universalism for human and civil rights, and the con-
nection between current emphasis on ‘national values’ and inequality
between cultural minorities and ‘the majority’. The main argument is
that current Swedish policy on cultural diversity and citizenship could
beneﬁt from Islamic social contract theory, which may even have in-
formed early modern European theories on social contract and religious
tolerance, e.g. John Locke, student of Arabic and Islam at Oxford Uni-
versity.
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